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Executive summary
Africa’s population is projected to reach almost 2.5 billion by 2050. Migration from Afri-
ca to the EU is relatively stable, at around 500,000 migrants per year, or 0.1 percent of the EU 
population, yet irregular immigration into the EU has increased recently.
Development is often seen as the way to reduce migration but the development-migra-
tion nexus is complex. At low levels of development, migration might increase with rising 
GDP per capita. This applies to most of sub-Saharan Africa.
By contrast, North African countries are among the continent’s more developed econ-
omies. Their geographical positions make them natural partners for the EU. The region is 
diverse but political instability has been a common feature that in recent years has hindered 
economic development. Cyclical factors and deep-rooted structural weaknesses have also 
contributed to weak economic performance. Conditions for business are relatively poor and 
trade barriers in some sectors have prevented integration either between these countries or 
into global value chains. We propose five ways in which EU policymakers can contribute to 
development in North Africa and build partnerships on trade, investment and migration.
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1 Introduction
Africa is the continent with the fastest growing population in the world. Its population is 
projected to be more than twice its current level by 2050, reaching almost 2.5 billion, which 
would be 25 percent of world population. Population growth is very high in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, while population growth in the North African countries (NAC, consisting of Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) has slowed with sharply falling fertility rates. Still, the population of 
NAC is projected to grow by some 100 million over the next 35 years (see Table A1 in annex).
Higher GDP growth in Africa is a necessary condition for alleviating poverty. It also 
represents an opportunity for the EU. It is imperative for Africa to accelerate its develop-
ment to be able to improve living conditions for its rapidly increasing population. For the 
EU, Africa is a geographically close market, which is in need of much investment. With more 
growth, there would be more opportunities, including the opportunity to contribute to the 
green and sustainable development of the continent. 
Contributing to the development of Africa is a priority for global policymakers. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has an average GDP per capita in purchasing power terms of $3500, or 
only about one tenth of the EU’s average GDP per capita. The G20 has been working on a 
‘compact’ for Africa to support private investment and growth on the continent. The EU is 
playing a lead role in this global effort, partly motivated by the desire to contain immigra-
tion. The focus is certainly strongly influenced by the increase in ‘boat’ immigrants. Irregular 
border crossings from Africa have increased significantly in the last few years and are now 
about 200,000 per year. Migrants from Africa come predominantly from sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 1).
Figure 1: Frontex detections of irregular border crossings of African citizens into 
the EU
Source: Frontex, accessed in March 2017. Note: Data refers to detections of illegal border crossings rather than the number of persons, 
as the same person might cross the external border several times. However, there is currently no EU system in place able to trace each 
person’s movements following an illegal border crossing. Therefore, it is not possible to establish the precise number of persons who have 
illegally crossed the external border.
Overall, legal migration from Africa has been rather stable. Figure 2 shows the number 
of EU residence permits given to migrants from Africa1. The numbers have fallen by almost 
30 percent (29.4 percent) since 2008. In particular, immigration from Morocco has fallen 
substantially. Some of the migrants that have arrived in an irregular manner (as measured in 
1 Note that the data shown in the figure is not really comparable to the 2016 border crossings, because to obtain a 
residence permit there is a delay and data on permits is available only up to 2015. 
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the Frontex data) are not yet recorded in these statistics. The more recent increase in people 
arriving in boats is related to greater efforts to rescue people at sea2. The two data sources 
partially double count so that one cannot just add the Frontex data to the Eurostat data. 
Overall, the number of migrants coming to the EU from Africa seems to be about 
500,000 per year, or roughly 0.1 percent of the EU population. Migration from North Africa 
is falling. North Africa does not play a significant role in irregular border crossings.
Figure 2: First residence permits in EU28 to African citizens by citizenship
Source: Eurostat, table migr_resfirst, accessed in March 2017. Note: data refers to the number of first (unique) residence permits granted 
in an EU28 country to African nationals during the reference year, disaggregated by citizenship, with a minimum duration of 3 months.
Economic development is a critical objective but is not a panacea to reduce migration. 
The EU and other institutions often refer to development as the key to reducing migration 
into the EU3. But determinants of emigration and immigration are complex. Demographic 
pressures, youth unemployment, job opportunities in the country of destination, the growth 
of migrant networks and the desire to reunite families all play roles in migration. The recent 
recession in Europe certainly played a significant role in reducing immigration numbers, as 
have tighter immigration restrictions.
With rising incomes in sub-Saharan Africa, emigration numbers are likely to increase 
at first. A significant literature has established that below certain GDP-per-capita levels, an 
increase in income will increase emigration. Clemens (2014) establishes that up to $7000-
$9000 GDP per capita (PPP), increases in GDP increase emigration. The data shows that 
emigration only starts to fall at higher GDP-per-capita levels. Of 47 sub-Saharan countries for 
which data is available, only seven are currently above the $9000 GDP-per-capita level (PPP), 
while 39 have levels below $7000. If a 2 percent annual per capita growth rate is assumed, by 
2030, 35 countries would still be below that level. The population of these countries would 
increase to 1.05 billion4.
By contrast, North African countries are now in an income range where rising 
incomes might reduce the incidence of migration. All five North African countries have 
2 This has effectively increased the number of people attempting to cross. See EPSC, https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/
sites/epsc/files/strategic_note_issue_22_0.pdf.
3 See, for example Mogherini (2017) ‘Opening remarks at debate on managing migration along the central Medi-
terranean route’, February, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/19755/
Opening%20remarks%20by%20the%20HRVP%20Federica%20Mogherini%20at%20the%20debate%20on%20manag-
ing%20migration%20along%20the%20Central%20Mediterranean%20route.
4 This calculation is for illustrative purposes only because long-term growth projections are uncertain. Nevertheless, 
the 2 percent real growth rate per capita is often labelled an ‘iron law’, see for example Barro (2015). 
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income levels at or above the threshold5. Reduced incidence of migration does not neces-
sarily mean fewer migrants over the next few years because the population is growing and 
other factors are at play, such as improved economic conditions in Europe. However, it does 
mean that, provided a deterioration in political stability is avoided and provided the region’s 
economies continue to grow, large-scale migration from North Africa might become a thing of 
the past. 
The rest of this paper focuses mainly on development in North Africa. The countries 
of North Africa are direct EU neighbours whose economic and political stability is of great 
importance to Europe. They remain origin countries for migrants, especially young people 
who cannot find jobs, and they are major transit countries for migration from sub-Saharan 
Africa. We consider North Africa a gateway between Africa and Europe. We therefore discuss 
the current economic and political situations in the countries of North Africa and make a 
number of policy proposals to European leaders. 
2 The current state of the North African 
economies 
The NAC economies are diverse, making generalisations hazardous. The countries that 
span the southern coast of the Mediterranean share Arabic as the principal language and Is-
lam as the principal religion. But they are otherwise diverse. Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia still 
have large parts of their populations in agriculture (as much as 40 percent in Morocco) and 
depend on a variety of service and manufacturing activities, remittances and tourism for their 
foreign exchange. By contrast, Algeria and Libya are wealthier oil-and-gas state-driven econ-
omies. At plausible rates of extraction, Algeria’s proven oil and gas reserves could become 
exhausted in two generations whilst Libya’s will last into the foreseeable future.
All the NACs rank low on the UN’s Human Development Index, but with important dif-
ferences. For example, adult female illiteracy is 42 percent in Morocco, but only 15 percent in 
Libya. Morocco has the world’s largest reserves of phosphates. But the country is completely 
dependent for energy on oil and gas imports, as is Tunisia, while Egypt’s energy trade is 
roughly balanced. The Maghreb economies are closely tied to Europe, but Egypt’s more signif-
icant ties are to the Gulf countries.
Economic growth has not been sufficient to absorb the bulge in the young labour 
force. Prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011 and 2012, the North African economies saw an 
extended period of moderate economic growth. This was not, however, sufficient to absorb 
the large cohorts of young people entering the labour force, nor to meet the high expec-
tations of the growing number of educated men and women. Table 2 illustrates the sharp 
deceleration of growth in recent years, and also illustrates the narrowing gap between GDP 
growth and the growth in the population of working age, despite the fact that the latter has 
also slowed. The unemployment problem in the region remains grave and is not adequately 
conveyed by official statistics which only cover parts of the formal economy. 
The sharp slowdown of the North African economies in recent years is primarily the 
result of political instability. Various  surveys illustrate that political instability has been the 
main cause of the sharp decline in tourism and foreign investment across most of the region 
(De Lima et al, 2016). Domestic divisions in North Africa were long kept under control by 
authoritarian governments, but now that they are out in the open, it is evident that they run 
deep, are complex and will not be quickly resolved. These differences are fundamental and 
5 The precise threshold in the data should be treated with caution as it could shift in the future.
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concern whether the state should be secular or governed by religious laws, the prevalence of 
different religious groups, whether men and women should play an equal role in society, if 
countries should be republics or monarchies, and who – the central government or a specific 
tribe or geographic region – should have control over natural resources. The ongoing civil 
wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and the uncertainty about the willingness and capacity 
of the United States and of European powers to engage in the region, following previous failed 
interventions, greatly add to the political uncertainty in North Africa. The long-standing hos-
tility between Morocco and Algeria, which separates Morocco from the rest of North Africa 
geographically, and the fear of potentially contagious political instability throughout North 
Africa and beyond to the Levant clearly have not helped the cause of economic growth and 
integration.
Table 2: GDP and population growth
 
GDP growth Population ages 15-64 growth
2000-2011 2011-2016 2000-2011 2011-2016
Algeria 3.8% 3.5% 2.3% 1.3%
Egypt 4.6% 3.0% 2.6% 1.6%
Libya -4.7% - 2.0% -0.1%
Morocco 5.0% 3.2% 1.8% 1.5%
Tunisia 3.6% 2.6% 1.8% 0.8%
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.5% 3.5% 2.9% 3.0%
European Union 1.4% 1.1% 0.2% -0.3%
Source: World Bank databases. GDP: World Development Indicators and Global Economic Prospects. Population: Health Nutrition and 
Population Statistics: Population estimates and projections. Notes: GDP and population for year 2016 are projections. GDP is at constant 
2010 US$. Growth rates are calculated as compound annual growth rates (CAGR).
The outside environment has not helped the NAC economies in the recent past. The 
collapse of oil prices severely affected Algeria and Libya but has also helped partially redress 
external deficits in Morocco and Tunisia. Lower oil prices also meant that government defi-
cits in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia improved because they facilitated reforms that reduced 
expenditure on energy subsidies. The persistent slow growth and recession in the Mediter-
ranean countries of Europe, as North Africa’s main export markets, have certainly reduced 
North Africa’s growth rate since 20086. The sharp slowdown in world trade after the crisis also 
contributed to the growth deceleration.                    
However, beyond political divisions, one-time shocks and cyclical effects, there are 
structural impediments that account for North Africa’s weak economic performance. 
Despite free trade agreements that span the region, a salient feature of the North African 
economy is the nearly complete absence of intraregional trade. To a great extent this reflects 
the lack of complementarity in production structures and the region’s modest income and 
size compared to neighbouring Europe, to which North Africa is gravitationally attracted. 
But even North Africa’s trade pattern with Europe is of the traditional kind, reflecting the 
exchange of finished goods and raw materials, rather than components as part of interna-
tional value chains. 
NACs have failed to integrate in international value chains. One can point to three main 
reasons for North Africa’s failure to become part of international value chains. First, Algeria 
and Libya are energy exporting economies whose labour cost (as proxied by their income per 
capita) is far higher than that of countries with comparable levels of skill and institutional 
development that are well integrated into value chains (such as Vietnam). Second, the envi-
6 Zachmann et al (2012) called for a strategy to broaden the relations of the NACs with other countries of the EU in 
order to reduce dependency on a relatively slow-growing part of the EU.
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ronment for doing business, including in aspects important for the operation of value chains, 
such as ease of trading across borders and the ability to enforce contracts, scores relatively 
low (and worse than Romania or Mexico) (see Table 3). Third, North Africa appears to have 
suffered disproportionately from competition from eastern Europe. With EU enlargement, 
European production chains – involving both trade and FDI – extended east instead of south.  
Table 3: 2017 Ease of doing business rankings, selected countries
 
Ease of doing 
business
Trading across 
borders
Enforcing 
contracts
Algeria 156 178 102
Egypt 122 168 162
Libya 188 114 143
Morocco 68 63 57
Tunisia 77 92 76
Romania 36 1 26
Mexico 47 61 40
Vietnam 82 93 69
Source: World Bank 2017 Ease of Doing Business report. Note: Data refers to the world ranking of the selected countries.
Trade has not been a strong engine of growth for the region and trade agreements 
have not delivered. Gravity models, which predict countries’ trade flows as a function of their 
economic size and distance, suggest that the volume of trade between the European Union 
and the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries could be 3.5 to 4 times larger than it 
is, were the two regions to reach the EU’s level of integration (Ferragina et al, 2005). Intra-re-
gional trade within MENA is also low relative to that predicted by gravity models and worse 
than that in sub-Saharan Africa. In part, this is because the trade agreements Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia have with the EU have by and large failed to deliver on their promises. 
Four reasons the results of trade agreements have been so disappointing: First, prior to 
the current set of EU-Med trade agreements, the North African countries already had largely 
free access to European markets for manufactured goods – which account for the lion’s share 
of their trade – and they also enjoyed a small margin of preference relative to most other 
large exporters under GSP (Generalised Scheme of Preferences) arrangements. Therefore, 
the impact of the agreements on exports to the EU was naturally small. Second, a variety of 
impediments – including subsidies, quotas, reference prices and seasonal barriers – continue 
to hobble exports in the sectors in which North Africa has a revealed comparative advantage, 
notably agriculture (a large source of value added and even greater source of jobs in North 
Africa). Third, restrictive rules of origin and limited cumulation further restrict the North Afri-
can countries’ effective access to the EU market. Fourth, the aid flows associated with the EU 
trade agreements with North Africa are small compared to the needs. EU funds were primar-
ily oriented to the accession countries, which naturally benefitted from increased public and 
private investment and from the discipline of adopting the EU acquis.
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3 Contributing to development in North 
Africa and steering migration – an EU 
policy agenda
For North Africa to achieve lasting and significantly higher growth, both public and private 
investment is needed. Public investment can build infrastructure and provide education and 
health services. However, public resources cannot be the main driver of a modern, compet-
itive economy. The main issue in the region is not so much the quantity of capital but the 
quality of the environment in which capital is deployed. Algeria and Libya have large resource 
endowments that, rationally exploited, can enable high savings. And the region’s low de-
pendency ratio (a very large working age population compared to the number of old people 
and children) allows or should allow for an adequate savings rate and the ability to self-fund 
significant investments (Table 1). The critical question is then how to improve conditions for 
private investment. These conditions depend on the willingness of the NACs to reform, not on 
the EU. However, the EU can help provide some anchors to reform, even though it cannot rep-
licate the strategy employed towards central and eastern Europe, where institutional reform 
was linked to eventual EU membership7. 
We see five framework conditions that are of particular importance.
1. Political stability and greater security are critical factors. This falls largely outside the 
remit of finance ministers and economists, but political stability in the region is a prereq-
uisite for achieving development and managing migration. Without greater political and 
security stability, for example in Libya, it will be difficult to tackle migration pressures. The 
EU should put in place a comprehensive policy that combines foreign policy tools with 
development policies, granting of market access and financial initiatives.
2. Improving access to markets. Trade is important for boosting productivity, raising living 
standards and boosting long-term growth. Open trade in itself, however, is not enough. 
Strengthening the business environment and improving skills – discussed below – are 
preconditions for deriving the full benefits from trade. However, much more needs to 
be done to facilitate the region’s trade intra-regionally and with the EU. Services sectors 
remain protected, and even as tariffs have come down, many non-tariff barriers to trade 
exist. In agriculture, trade is still impeded by tariff and non-tariff barriers, including by the 
use of various kinds of quotas. While effectively applied tariff rates have fallen overall (see 
Figure A2), they remain comparatively high in some sectors. Foreign direct investment 
and access to land is impeded in numerous ways.
The EU has started negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agree-
ment (DCFTA) with Tunisia and Morocco (negotiations with Morocco have been sus-
pended since 2013). The DCFTA is intended to go further than traditional free trade agree-
ments by establishing a framework for economic development that opens markets and also 
achieves extensive harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations, aligning key sectors to EU 
standards. The DCFTA is also intended to provide for freedom of establishment in services 
and non-services sectors on condition that the EU acquis is implemented. While laudable, 
it is unclear whether the DCFTA initiative as currently structured can provide the impetus 
to reform that is needed in the NACs. Recognising that EU accession is not envisaged, con-
sideration should be given to DCFTAs that demand more of the NACs on the reform front 
but also offer more in the form of market access and development funds. A platform for 
dialogue between the private and public sectors could help establish a way forward.
7 Sapir and Zachmann (2011) discuss lessons for the Southern Mediterranean that could be taken from the EU’s 
experience in eastern Europe.
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3. Promoting good governance and strengthening the institutions that underpin private 
entrepreneurship. The NACs generally rank low in terms of ease of doing business, good 
governance, competition and rule of law. Improvements in all these areas are essential for 
economic growth8. The EU can deploy official development aid and lending programmes 
to support these reform efforts. Recent initiatives include, for example, increased sup-
port from the European Investment Bank to provide funding at preferential rates9. 
Project-based funding from the EIB, EBRD and the World Bank contributes financial 
resources and, more importantly, technical expertise and encouragement of reforms 
that have been shown to work elsewhere10. Official Development Assistance net loans 
and grants to the five NACs range from 0.1 percent of GDP in Algeria to 1.8 percent in 
Tunisia11. Before expanding such programmes, a rigorous evaluation of the most effective 
approaches should be undertaken, focusing especially on the catalysing effects of such 
interventions.  International Monetary Fund programmes in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 
and the ongoing surveillance and technical assistance programmes throughout the 
region, also play significant roles in promoting growth and stability-friendly reforms.
4. Reforming education and containing youth unemployment. Youth unemployment has 
been an important drag on these countries’ performances, a source of dissatisfaction and 
unrest, and an important factor behind decisions to emigrate. The difficulty young people 
face to enter the NAC labour markets has detrimental effects on their future employa-
bility because of the depreciation of skills and their life-time income. This affects labour 
markets and hinders inclusive growth and leads to the loss of entire generations. With 
the exception of Morocco, all other countries in the sample have about double the level 
of youth unemployment than observed in EU2812. The level of youth unemployment is 
particularly high for women, in some cases twice as high as that for men, and has typically 
deteriorated since 2010 for both genders. Importantly, the highly educated are more likely 
to be unemployed – a factor that points to a grave misallocation of resources (Dine, 2012).
Demographics is one of the factors driving youth unemployment. Whether growth 
is driven by capital intensive sectors also matters for employment, as does the tax system 
and labour market institutions. Also, poor education and inadequate skills reduce the 
employability of the young. Lastly, the MENA economies are characterised by high infor-
mality and their relatively small formal labour markets favour incumbents to the detri-
ment of new entrants, mostly the young.
A credible strategy to tackle youth unemployment must therefore go beyond the 
general reform agenda (improving the business environment, the rule of law and market 
access) and focus on reducing the gap between the formal and the informal sectors. 
Containing the reservation wage13 by moderating wage increases in the public sector, in 
particular in rentier economies, is also important. These are necessary conditions that 
need to be complemented by targeted programmes to correct the pronounced skill mis-
match between graduates and what employers demand (McKinsey 2011). Programmes 
that provide on-the-job training are equally important. 
5. Step-up collaboration on containing migration pressures from sub-Saharan Africa. 
As sub-Saharan Africa develops and the size of its young population increases, emigration 
pressures are likely to mount in the next 20 years. The destination of emigrants will be 
determined by numerous factors, including the opportunities in Europe, in North Africa 
and the Middle East. North African countries themselves will increasingly become a 
destination for migrants. There is no alternative to encouraging the integration of markets 
8 Bouis et al (2016), for example, document that product market reforms, such as opening up regulated sectors such 
as telecoms to competition, can yield substantial benefits in GDP.
9 Annual EIB lending in the framework of the economic resilience initiative is around €1.6 billion annually. 
10 De Lima et al (2016). See Table A2 for an overview.
11 See Figure A1 for a description of ODA to North Africa by donor.
12 See, for example Boot et al (2016).
13 The lowest wage rate at which a worker would be willing to accept a particular type of job.
10 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚10 | 2017
within Africa and improving the conditions for investment in sub-Saharan Africa as the 
long-term solution to Africa’s problems, and also to create potentially vast new markets for 
both the EU and the NACs. Research shows that one of the most effective ways to deploy 
public resources is to enhance the education of girls, which tends to accelerate the demo-
graphic transition, sharply reducing the fertility rate, and contributes to improved health 
and education outcomes among children.
Development policies need to be combined with a strategy on migration. The EU and 
its members have an active development policy in sub-Saharan Africa, and the G20 initia-
tive tries to further leverage private investment. However, more attention should be paid to 
migration policies14 and how they can be made to work better for the countries of origin, for 
Europe and to enhance the welfare and safety of the migrants themselves. The EU should 
explore partnership frameworks on migration with the countries of North Africa. Promoting 
development, granting greater access to EU markets, including for services workers, enhanc-
ing collaboration related to university education and providing temporary work opportunities 
for highly-skilled workers could all be elements of a ‘compact’ on migration. Programmes 
that strengthen the economic links between the North African countries and their emigrants 
based in Europe (diasporas) can also facilitate trade, investment and the return of migrants. 
Readmission agreements could be established. Moreover, the EU could establish admission 
centres in the region that would grant a certain number of legal immigration permits to 
sub-Saharan African nationals wishing to migrate to the EU15. Such a policy could also help 
disrupt the business model behind illegal human trafficking.   
Overall, the EU should strengthen its partnership with North Africa and offer increas-
ing links in trade, investment and cross-border service provisioning. The aim of that policy 
compact would be to establish stability, foster growth and build a prosperous neighbourhood, 
within which collaboration on migration is recognised as an important aspect.
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Annex
Detailed sources used in Table 1
1. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015 
revision.
2. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, accessed in March 2017.
3. UNESCO, August 2015 release.
4. UNDP, based on Barro and Lee (2016).
5. ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates, Nov. 2016.
6. SWIID 2016, Standardized World Income Inequality Database. Note: higher values imply 
higher income inequality. 
7. World Bank, Ease of Doing Business 2017.
8. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016.
9. OECD International Development Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and 
regions (Table DAC2a), accessed in March 2017.
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Table A1:  Current and projected populations
Current and projected African population (thousands)
  1980 1990 2000 2010 2020(p) 2030(p) 2040(p) 2050(p)
Libya 3,191 4,398  5,337  6,266   6,700   7,418   7,980   8,375 
Tunisia 6,368 8,233  9,699 10,639 11,835 12,686 13,166 13,476 
Morocco 20,072 24,950 28,951 32,108 36,444 39,787 42,148 43,696 
Algeria 19,338 25,912 31,184 36,036 43,008 48,274 52,496 56,461 
Egypt 43,370 56,397 68,335 82,041 100,518 117,102 134,428 151,111 
Total North Africa 92,339 119,891 143,506 167,090 198,505 225,267 250,219 273,119 
10-year change - 27,552 23,615 23,584 31,415 26,762 24,952 22,901 
% change - 29.8% 19.7% 16.4% 18.8% 13.5% 11.1% 9.2%
Rest of Africa 385,626 511,723 670,558 877,017 1,141,598 1,454,034 1,812,811 2,204,417 
10-year change - 126,097 158,834 206,460 264,581 312,436 358,777 391,606 
% change - 32.7% 31.0% 30.8% 30.2% 27.4% 24.7% 21.6%
Total Africa 477,965 631,614 814,063 1,044,107 1,340,103 1,679,301 2,063,030 2,477,536 
10-year change - 153,649 182,449 230,044 295,996 339,198 383,729 414,506 
% change - 32.1% 28.9% 28.3% 28.3% 25.3% 22.9% 20.1%
Source: UNDESA Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2015 Revision, accessed in March 2017. Note: projections according to the UNDESA medium fertility variant.
Table A2: Overview of the activities of major multilateral development banks in the region
Activities in the Mediterranean neighbourhood countries (MENA/SEMED/FEMIP)
World 
Bank
World Bank lending to the MENA region in FY2013 amounted to US$2.1 bn ($1.8bn from IBRD, $249mn from IDA and 
$56.4mn in special financing for the West Bank and Gaza).
IBRD/IDA lending increased to $2.8bn in FY14, $3.5bn in FY15 and $5.2bn (€4.7bn) in FY16. The increase in FY16 
occurred particularly in Egypt and Iraq.
Around 20% of the lending is for climate change initiatives, reaching $1.2bn in 2016.
The FY17 Q1 lending (July-September) is expected to account for close to $1bn, including the Emergency Crisis Response 
Project for Yemen, Lebanon and Jordan.
EBRD
In 2012-2016 invested over €5bn in more than 100 projects in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Lebanon is becoming a 
shareholder and country of operations in the near future. 
In 2016 invested €1.7bn in the SEMED region, 5.6% of the total (€30bn), with large majority in loans and the rest (~20%) in 
equity investments. 
75% of EBRD’s lending to SEMED countries is to the private sector, although also PPPs. Main industries of investment: 
Bank FI (22.6%), Energy (22.3%), Infrastructure (20.1%).
SEMED receives around 20% of EBRD’s SME funding and more than 28% of the microfinance portfolio.
EIB
Committed €9.6bn for lending activity for the 2014-2020 period in FEMIP countries (Southern Neighbourhood). Total 
lending of €14.6bn from 2007 to date.
Already signed €1.6bn in 2014, €1.4bn in 2015 and €1.6bn in 2016, i.e. 19% of EIB’s non-EU activity (€8.4bn). Total EIB’s 
lending in 2016 was €84bn. 
2007-2016: 27.7% of activities in Egypt, 26% in Morocco, 23% in Tunisia. 
2007-2016: 30% of activities in Energy (target of 35% for outside-EU lending for climate action by 2020), 16% in Transport 
and 15% in SME financing.
Its lending activity is project-linked, financing of the fixed asset component, up to 50% of total project costs. Direct loans 
only for amounts above €25 mn and maturities extend up to 25 years. 
EIB’s Economic Resilience Initiative: additional lending of €4.2bn over the next five years in the Southern Neighbourhood, 
of which:
€1.5bn of additional lending to the public and private sector within existing frameworks;
€900m additional lending on especially favourable terms to the local public sector;
€1.8bn for higher risk, higher impact financing to support the private sector.
Source: Institutional reports, websites and presentations, accessed in March 2017. SEMED is the EBRD acronym for the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region. FEMIP stands for 
Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership, which brings together all the instruments implemented by the EIB in support of economic development in the Mediterranean 
partner countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, Gaza-West Bank, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and in the future Libya. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD).
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Figure A1: Total grants (blue) and ODA net loans (orange) to North Africa, by donor
Source: OECD International Development Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [Table DAC2a], accessed in March 2017. Notes: ODA (Official Development 
Assistance) net loans display disbursement minus repayment. To be classified as ODA, a loan must be provided at concessional financial terms, ie including at least a 25 percent grant 
component.
Figure A2: Overall effectively applied tariff rates, % (AHS), weighted by partner/product flows
Source: World Bank staff estimates using the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) system, based on data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Trade Analysis 
and Information System (TRAINS) database and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Integrated Data Base (IDB) and Consolidated Tariff Schedules (CTS) database. Notes: Weighted 
mean applied tariff is the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product import shares corresponding to each partner country.  Effectively applied tariff rates at the six- and 
eight-digit product level are averaged for products in each commodity group. If a preferential tariff exists (and is available), it has been used as the effectively applied tariff (otherwise, 
MFN applied). Missing data, (1999-all countries, 2010-2013 for Algeria) were replaced by linear interpolation.
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